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Stephen Ellis 
This essay offers some preliminary reflections on the ways in which 
scholars have considered African wars of liberation, that is to say organised, 
a~ed.~~p~igns ":'~!ch have been widely perceived !o have as their a~m the 
esta&hshment of some sort of coliective assertiOn of self-choice in 
government,~ most often interpreted in terms of the rejection of authority 
wieraea- oy foreigners, especially European colonialists. As with most 
subjects 1n contemporary history, it is not only professional scholars who 
are responsible for the extant literature on this subject, but also politicians, 
journalists and others who have influenced one another and have contributed 
to our overall understanding of liberation wars. 
TQis is a topic on whicq Rob Buijtenhuijs has made a significant 
contribution, initially through his work on the 1950s Mau Mau insurgency 
in Kenya, and later through two books on the Frolinat-led insurgency in 
Chadl. His most recently published works have concentrated on the political 
processes connected with the introduction of a multi-party system and 
formal elements of democracy in Chad2. During the course of this work he 
has come to question the very notion that armed insurgents are primarily to 
be understood as people in rational pursuit of specific ideals, emphasising 
rather the elements of contingency and confusion which are prominent in 
times of armed insurrection or civil war3. This gradual shift in his thinking 
--,,"-·~-~ that while Buijtenhuijs has maintained the interest in political 
emancamlti·c m which has been such a central feature of his work, he has over 
course of time become somewhat disillusioned by the politics of armed 
If this is so, then he is certainly not alone in this regard, as we shall 
For present purposes, a useful way of approaching this subject - which 
at first sight appear tangential, but which is of great relevance - is to 
1. BuijtenhuiJS, R., 1971, 1978, 1987a 
2 Bmjtenhuijs, R., 1993, 1998b 
3. BmJtenhUIJS, R., 1996. 
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consider some of the general assumptions which have been commonly 
applied to African history ~nd ~hich ~av~ se~ved as a. framework for a great 
deal of writing about Afnca, mcludmg m ftelds whtch are not concerned 
with historical reconstruction in the first instance but with other areas of 
academic inquiry, such as in sociology and political science. ~his inq~iry 
constitutes the first part of the present paper. The second and thtrd se.ctwns 
consider more directly some of the ways in which scholars have constd~red 
the historical significance and even the moral worth of those .orgamsed 
campaigns of violence which, ostensibl~ at leas~, ha:ve ha~ as thetr goal the 
liberation of some part of the populatiOn. Thts dtscusswn comes to the 
conclusion that there has for some years been a growing perception among 
writers on the subject that many self-proclaimed liberators in Africa have 
achieved rather little of what they promised. This scepticism is combined 
with an alarm in many quarters at the scale of violence in Africa in recent 
years, and also with an increasing difficulty experienced by many 
commentators in reaching a satisfactory understandmg of the nature or 
purpose of some recent episodes of large-scale violence. Together, these 
doubts or uncertainties have resulted in a number of new approaches to 
writing on wars in Africa. The fourth and last section of the paper su~gests 
some new trends in historical interpretation which have been apphed to 
various parts of the world and which might, it would seem, be usefully 
applied to Africa as well. 
Periods of African history 
Although Africa is an ancient continent, in terms both of geology ~nd 
human occupation, the writing of its history is a striking~y rece~t e~terpns~. 
In fact the systematic study of African history by professwnal htstonans - m 
short academic history-writing -began only in the mid-twentieth century. 
To b~ sure, long before then both Africans and non-Africans .h~d written 
chronicles, memoirs and travel guides or other texts contammg some 
historical material, and it could be argued that recognisable histories of parts 
of Africa were being published already in the seventeenth century4 •• The 
nineteenth century in particular saw some notable attempts both by .Afncans 
and by others to write histories of various parts of the contment on 
conventional chronological lines, such as William Ellis's History of 
Madagascar (1833) or Samuel Johnson's History of th.e Yorubas ~1897) 5 • 
Nevertheless, it remains true to say that the productiOn by Afncans of 
serviceable narratives of times past was done almost entirely by word of 
mouth until well into the twentieth century. Before that time there were 
rather few Africans who could read and write, and fewer still accomplished 
4. Vansina, J., 1994, pp. 40-59. 
5. Johnson, S., 1921, was completed in 1897 but published only later. 
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scholars with th.e leisure n~ces~ary for historical research. As for foreigners, 
few had the nght combmatwn of time, materials, and inclination to 
under~ake a ~igorous examination of the African past, although the early 
colo!u.al penod saw plenty of publications by European scholars and 
admtmst~ators of ethnographic material containing some historical data. 
Only m 1948 ~as the first u~iversity post in African history created, at 
the School of .onental and Afncan Studies in London, and this event is 
gen~ra!ly constdered to be the first clear evidence that African history was 
achtevt~g at least a degree of recognition as a legitimate subject among 
professwnal scholars, although sometimes in the face of considerable 
reticen?e 6 • It was e~citing. to be one of the generation pioneering the 
academtc s~udy of Afncan .htstory ; such, at least, is the impression gained 
rrom r~ad~ng the ~emo1rs of those European historians who were 
mfluent~al m t~e peno.d and who could be regarded as having created space 
for Afncan htstory. m professional academic circles?. (What African 
scholars or other Arnca~s thought of this great historiographical venture is 
les~ easy t? deterr~une smce they have been less forthcoming in producing 
~etr ~utobwgrap.htes.) Collectively, a relatively small band of professional 
htstonans operatmg from universities in the third .quarter of the twentieth 
century, African and non-African alike, was able to create the outlines of an 
academically respectable view of the past of what Victorians used to call the 
~ark Contin~nt. A great deal of the work of the generation of academic 
pwneers contmues to go.ve~n ~he way in which Africa's history is conceived 
a~o?g scholars of all dtsctphnes and to find reflection in a wider body of 
optmon. 
Perhap~ the mos~ bas.ic o~ all ~e conventions established by the first wave 
of p~o~essw.nal Afncamst hts~onans is the notion that African history may 
be ~hvtded mto the p~ec_olomal, colonial and postcolonial or independent 
penods. At bottom, thts ts no more than an assertion that the establishment or colonial rule marked some sort of major feature in the course of African 
htstory, a!l observation so difficult to refute that even today, forty years 
after the mdependence of many African countries, most observers would 
almost certainly stil~ ~gree ~ith it. But the fact that it remains helpful to this 
day to suppose. that tt ts posstble to make some sort of meaningful distinction 
between coloma! and precolonial periods of African history should not lead 
us to regard an intellectual convention as though it were itself a phenomenon 
of the same. type .as ~ specific. historic~! fact. The unearthing of historical 
data and thetr attnbutton to penods of ttme which are deemed to have some 
S?rt or retrospective unity or coherence - the essential activity of academic 
htstonans - always tends to apply a layer of ideological interpretation to the 
actions of historical figures who may not have been aware that they were 
6. Some US umve~sities ha? previously had professiOnal teachers of what would now 
be ~ailed ~fnca~ Am~ncan studies and many black American mtellectuals had drawn on 
Afncan histo~y I~ their work. Melville Herskovits IS generally regarded as the first US 
aca~emic Afr~camst to. have had substantial influence outside the established tradition of 
Afncan Amencan studies. Cf. Zeleza, P.T., 1997. 
7. Deschamps, H., 1975; Vansina, J., op. cit.; Oliver, R., 1997. 
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living in such periods and who, eve11: if the~ were ~onscious of it, may ~ave 
acted as they did in pursuit of objectives quite foreign to the preoccupat1~ns 
of later writers. Just as King Richard III was not aware ~hat he was closmg 
the period of English medieval history when he lay dymg at the batt!~ of 
Bosworth in 1485, so, to take an African example,. the great ~ahnke 
warlord Samory Toure was not aware that he ~as creatmg a reputatiOn ~s a 
proto-nationalist freedom fighter when he rmded for slaves_ and forcibly 
converted tens of thousands of people to Islam through a Wide_ swathe of 
central West Africa in the 1880sB. The imposition of any sort of mtellec~ual 
order on a mass of historical data always involves some son; of theoretical 
or ideological assumptions ... if, that is, ~e are to a~cep~ the extstence of such 
things as clear historical facts at all, whtch some htstonans are loath to do on 
philosophical grounds9. . 
In short, we should not forget that the fundamental chronologiC~l 
categories which historians create or id~nti~y and subsequently u~e are I_n 
fact later impositions on masses of ~1st~ncal facts. !hey acqmre their 
significance only with the benefit of hmdstg~t. In practice, however, these 
classifications tend to gain the status of estabhshed truth as they are used and 
re-used by authors and teachers and their readers or s~udents. To take ~n 
obvious example, the widely-used European conventiOn that there exist 
ancient medieval and modern periods of history clearly represents some 
sort of ~upposition that each of these three periods of ti~e had _(or has) s?me 
definable qualitative difference, some propert~ ~ecu~tar to Its o~n time, 
which makes it possible and meaningful to distmgmsh one perw_d from 
another. To inquire what these properties may be is to plunge tnt~ an 
intellectual current which goes back some two hundred _years, characte!'sed 
by a view that the world has progressed over th~ centun_es ~owards a htgh~r 
plane, in the fields of human social and economic orgamsatwn as well as_m 
the evolution of species. This has become such a fundamental tenet of belief 
among most people in the industrialised countries of Europe and North 
America that it is sometimes assumed to be almost a law of nature. . . 
It is imporant to note, however, that not all ~eople and not all societies 
hold a general belief in the progress of humankmd. ~n the con~rar~,0 some cultures have tried to keep their world as nearly static as possible , and 
others have believed that humankind has in fact degenerated through the 
centuries or that history is cyclical. The idea held by most ~ur~peans and 
North Americans today that there has been progress fro~ anttqmt~ th~ough 
the middle ages to the modern period has been an e~senttal un~~rpmmng to 
virtually all categories of Western thought, perhaps smce the Enhghte~me11:t, 
and most certainly since the mid-nineteenth century11 •. So ~r~ IS th~s 
chronological bedrock, and the idea of linear progress contamed m It, that It 
8. Person Y.,1968-75. The first president of Guinea, Ahmed Sekou Toure, claimed 
descent from Sammy Toure. 
9. Jenkins, K., 1991. 
10. Cf. Cohn, N., 1993. w·
1
r 
11. Pomper, P., Elphick, R.H., and Vann, R. T., 1998, esp. the essay by 1 1am 
Green on pp. 53-65. 
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is h~rdly pos~ible to _think in terms of ancient, medieval and modern periods 
of history wtthout Simultaneously evoking the idea that humankind (or at 
le~s~ Europeans, for whom and in respect of whom this chronology was 
ongmally constructed) has progressed over the years in some sense. If more 
people today than ~ hundred years ago might question the notion that Europe 
has seen a moral ~mprove~ent over time, the vast majority of Europeans 
would no doubt sttll subscnbe to the notion that an increase in wealth life 
expectancy and technological capacity represents progress of some sort. ' 
~hen ~he aca_demic pioneers of African history formalised the division of 
Afncan. history mto precolonial, colonial, and independent or postcolonial 
~ate~on~s, they were _endowing their subject-matter with many of the 
tmph~atwns ~f such a hnear, chronological categorisation of .their material. 
This IS not to Imply that these historians were necessarily naive or blinkered 
for, as one_ French hi~torian wrote at the time, any history based on 
chronol?g~ 1~ the ~ur~pean tradition inevitably carried certain implications 
for Afnca_s msertlon ~.n the world. The creation of such a history, Henri 
Brunsch':"Ig noted, offers to all peoples a rational and critical 
constr~ctwn ... If A[ricans wish to create a history today, it is a sign that 
they Wish to enter mto a global system of interactions, the rules of which 
ha_ve. to a large extent been written in the West12". It is more than 
comc1d~ntal, t?en, _that ~he creation of a new history of Africa by an elite of 
professiOnal h1ston~ns m the 1950s and 1960s was taking place at the very 
moment that sovereign states were being created in Africa as full members 
of the recognised family of nations : the historiographical and political 
elements were conn~cted. A _continent which had previously been regarded 
by Eu~opeans_ as havi_ng no history worth knowing was now claiming its full 
place m the hterate, mtellectual, historical imagination of the world. It was 
not only African leade~s and intellectuals or foreign Afrophiles who were 
ke~n t~ see more extensive research and publication on African societies and 
theu history, but also university funding committees research institutes and 
others in the world's richest countries. ' 
As pe~haps the_ most popular of Africanist historians put it, in a book full 
of optimism I_>Ubhsh~d m 1959, Africa's history was beginning anew with 
the proclamatiOns o! mdependenc_e1 3. But not all Africanist scholars, by any 
means, were enthusiasts for the victory of nationalism in Africa, since there 
were some who regarded the colonial achievement with considerable 
re~pect~4 : Many of the new foreign specialists in African studies in European 
umversttles were former colonial administrators themselves, who could 
hardly be expected to renounce half their life's work like the historian 
Hubert Deschamps in Paris, or they came from coloni~l families, like his 
L~ndo~ counterpart, Roland Oliver1 s. Nor were all Africanist historians 
pnmanly concerned with the study of what was becoming known as "the 
12. Brunschwig, H., 1962, pp. 874-5. 
13. Davidson, B., 1970, pp. 266-8. 
14. E.g. Gann, L., 1993. 
15. Deschamps, H., op. cit. ; Oliver, R., op. cit. 
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colonial period", and in fact one of the most important achievements of the 
first generation of professional academic historians of Africa was to produce 
studies of the distant African past, of a time long before the creation of 
European colonial administrations16. Nevertheless, even a specialist in 
ancient history like Cheikh Anta Diop, famous for his theories on the 
African heritage from ancient Egypt17, was operating within the conventions 
governing the modern Western division of historical knowledge into 
chronological series, subscribing to a common set of rules concerning the 
nature of historical reality and of time. Once again, these are not universal 
norms, since other societies have used other ways of conceiving of what 
their ancestors did. (We may note in passing that the exploration of how oral 
histories were constructed in Africa was in fact another of the notable 
achievements of the early academic historians of Africals . ) 
Thus, European, American or (increasingly from the 1950s) African 
historians ; specialists in ancient history or writers on present times ; 
historians, political scientists or other scholars : all of these, using basic 
Western scientific concepts concerning time and change, tended to subscribe 
to certain common assumptions about the African past. Prominent among 
these was that the colonial period had a deep historical meaning in the sense 
of forming some sort of dividing line in Africa's historical development. 
Exactly what the historical significance of colonialism might be was a matter 
for debate, but all commentators were convinced that it marked a watershed 
of some sort. The concepts of Africa's precolonial, colonial and postcolonial 
history were established. 
The liberation of Africa 
History, while making a crucial intellectual contribution, was probably 
not the most significant academic discipline which interested itself in 
emerging new fields of study in Africa from the mid-twentieth century 
onwards, as Africa became the site of over 50 new sovereign states. Nor 
were histOrians by ahymeans-the-<lnly acaderriic observers who developed an 
interest in, and often a personal sympathy with, the. emerging_ African 
nationalist movements which, from the mid-1950s onw~ds, w~re ac_quiring 
~ontrol of these"- sovereign states in the act of independence o~-
16. At its inception in 1963, the Organisation of African Unity issued a call for the 
publication of a comprehensive history of Africa, an initiative which was to lead to the 
UNESCO Afncan history series, authored largely by Afncans, which eventually fimshed 
publication in 1993. See Vansina, J., 1993. Other institutions and even individuals have also 
attempted to write comprehensive histories of Africa, such as the eight-volume Cambridge 
History of Africa, begun in 1965 and completed in 1986. On the latter, Oliver, R., op. cit., 
pp. 294-6. 
17. Diop, C.A., 1960. 
18. The pioneering work was Vansina, J., 1961. 
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~~~ol~~-isa~C:?·- f?litical scientists, naturally enough, were centrally 
con~ern~d to mvestlgate the nature of these new phenomena, and so too were 
socwlogx~ts .and .many others, while anthropology remained the discipline 
most spectahsed m the analysis of African societies. 
So~e of t?e foreign writers most full of enthusiasm for the new political 
order m Afnca employed their talents, in a spirit of deliberate political 
eng~gemen~, to ~reate a s~holar~hip which they intended to be supportive of 
Afncan na~IO~a~Ism. Basil Davidson, for example, probably did more than 
a?y other mdiv~dual to popularise in the English-speaking world a heroic 
vxew of th~ Afncan past strongly coloured by his nationalist sympathies19. 
As ~or Afn~~n~ themselves, some outstanding intellectuals actually hecame 
lea~mg pohtlctans, such as the anthropologists Jomo Kenyatta and K.B. 
Busta or the poets Leopold Sedar Senghor and Agostinho Neto. 
If :ve ~an understan~ wh~ many intellectuals, African and non-African, 
were mchned to see natwnahsm as a form of progress, it is even more easy 
!o see wh~ the gover?ors of newly created African states might have been 
mterested m the creatiOn of academic historical accounts which could serve "--
as chart~rs of sovere_ignty apd support their claim to respectability in 
Western I~telle~tual Circles. ~-o~ is it hard to understand why,_ gjyt?n th~ir 
~~. gf_ ~att~~,lll~.S{I} _ f!_.~a.J~Ql;nhsmg force4. they often wished to emphasise 
thexr antl-colomal credentials. More difficult to trace is the influence of the 
accounts of African nationalism which began to circulate in academic books 
and_ journals o~ the various popular narratives which circulated among 
~fncan populatiOns who, as in the past, continued to form their historical 
VIews largely on the basis of oral tradition. The dialectic between official 
and popular historic~! nar;ativ~s is _certainly a field worthy of further study. 
What mfluence natwnahst histonography had on the mass of Africans 
remains open to question. 
The development of a new academic vision of African nationalism 
sensitiv~ to the c~aims of African nationalists themselves, called into questio~ 
some VIews ~hxch .were then current in European seats of learning. At 
bottom, the pomt bemg contested between enthusiasts for the new vision of 
African h~story and o~he_rs who ~ere less persuaded of its validity was the 
real meanu~g of_ colomahsm. Until the 1960s it was widely accepted among 
European histonans that the imposition of colonial rule marked some sort of 
progress for Afri~a in the sense of a decisive break with all that had gone 
before. Those Afncans who took up arms to resist the imposition of colonial 
rule ~ere therefore easi~Y. conceived ot by i?Iperial historians as having 
acted m def~nce of a _trad~twnal way of hfe which was doomed to disappear. 
Rep~esentattve of thts VIew was, for example, the account published by 
Robmson an~ Gallagher, two emment British histonans of emptre, in The 
New Cambndge Modern History in 196220. They considered that the 
19. Basil Davidson has published over 20 boo~s on African history and politics and 
was also the pres~nter of a successful BBC-TV senes. For some short autobiographical 
elements, see Davidson, B., 1994, pp. 97-102. 
20. Robinson, R., and Gallagher, J., 1962. 
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establishment of colonial rule marked a rupture with previous periods of 
Afncan history so complete that the nationalism which e~entually replac~d 
colonialism could only be interpreted as a force ~1thout .s~~stanttal 
indigenous roots, developed by a new generation. of Afncan pohtlctans and 
intellectuals who had been formed by the coloma! powers themselves an.d 
who had thereby learned how to operate the colonial syste.ms to t~etr 
advantage. They were deemed to have little in comm~n wtth the ftrst 
generation of resisters of colonial rule, those of the late mn~t~enth century 
who had opposed alien rule not in the name of a modern pohtteal force but 
in the cause of tradition. 
The most influential criticism of the conventional European notio!l that 
African nationalism was a force created by colonialism itself, in the tmage 
of the coloniser, was conveyed in a series of. works by :rerence Ranger, a 
British historian who had worked in coloma! Rhodesia. Expe.lled fr?~ 
Rhodesia on account of his African nationalist sympathies, thts P.roh~tc 
writer and lecturer went on to head the most dynamic school of Afncamst 
historiography within the continent, in Dar es Salaam.' befo~e eventually 
taking a chair at Oxford. A seminal conference on Afncan his~ory ~eld at 
Dares Salaam in 1965 resulted in publication under Ranger's editorship o_f a 
series of papers on emerging themes in African history, several of which 
pointed to the significance of armed resistance to colonial rule2.1 . Ranger 
published on his own account a two-part essay o~ armed resista?ce to 
colonial rule in the Journal of African History22 which became an mstant 
classic. In it, he connected the history of what had happened when 
Europeans first imposed colonial rule on Africa with what occurred. two ?r 
three generations later at the tit_U~ of indepen?ence, when modern natwnahst 
movements emerged in opposition to coloma! or settl~r rule. Both set~ of 
events he saw as part of one long process of confrontatiOn ?etwe.en ~fncan 
societies and the forces of colonialism. Ranger began his article m the 
Journal of African History with an attack on Robinson and <?allaghe~, who 
had represented early resistance to colonial rule ?s "romantic, reactiOnary 
struggles against the facts", in contrast to modern mdependence m.ove~ents 
which they termed "defter nationalisms", since they were "operatmg m the 
idiom of the Westerners23." Ranger, rather than emphasising the contrast 
between older and newer forms of resistance, preferred to see all forms of 
resistance to colonialism as essentially similar. All were related to 
nationalism itself the flowering of the tradition of independence. He labelled 
the early re~isters of colonial rule as ~~ganisers of "p~mary ~~sistance", and 
later generations as proponents of secondary r~ststanc~ . <?ne of the 
principal tasks for historians was to trace the prec~se relatiOnship between 
the two, which would also have the effect of tracmg the roots of modern 
African nationalism back into the nineteenth century. 
The view of the historical roots of nationalism sketched by Ranger and 
21. Ranger, 1968a. 
22. Ranger, 1968b. 
23. Quoted in ibid., p. 437. 
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others in the late 1960s soon became an orthodoxy among the new 
generation of politically engaged Africanists who often acted in the spirit of 
what one acute observer, himself a former member of the history 
department at Dar Es Salaam, called a "Committee of Concerned Scholars 
for a Free Africa24 ". There were always a substantial number of scholars 
who remained sceptical of the notion that there existed such a pure 
nationalist strain of African resistance to colonial rule2 s. This was 
particularly so among French-speaking scholars, for example26. 
If a full-blooded nationalist interpretation of the colonial period gained 
such popularity in the late 1960s and 1970s, it was perhaps less because of its 
intellectual persuasiveness than because it gave precise form to a notion 
much more widely held in society at large, as is often the case with historical 
orthodoxies. In this particular case, the idea that militant nationalism was the 
fruition of a spirit of resistance which had been present throughout the 
colonial period, and which now emerged to claim the leadership of African 
co~ntries ?s sovereign members of the international family of nations, 
chimed With a widespread perception that the emergence of African 
nationalism as a political force marked some sort of progress. Since 
Africanist historians construed resistance to colonialism to be an act in tune 
with history itself, those who fought against the imposition of colonial rule 
in the late nineteenth century, or shortly after, came to appear as proto-
nationalists, sometimes visionary, always on the right side of history. And 
since colonial rule, in the view of many scholars working on Africa from 
the 1950s onwards, was self-evidently an injustice, and at the very least an 
idea whose time had gone, it was tempting to consider Africans who had 
worked enthusiastically with colonial administrations as "collaborators", a 
word loaded with reference to Nazi-occupied Europe, as was noted by a 
French communist who had lived through the German occupation of 
France27. 
The creation or identification of a nationalist history could hardly be 
other than a politically charged act in the years when African countries were 
gaining their independence, just as its opposite (that is, the denial that such a 
history existed) would also have been politically charged, if any scholar of 
standing had been foolhardy enough to undertake the task2B. Most of Africa 
aftes_1JjQ:o~!~ ~a~e ~a!!_sfa<;tion !n the knowledge that ccif~nittnil;;~proper 
had gone, out muCK of southern Africa in particular still awaited its 
liberation. -si~ce "~loionfal and settler regimes of that region refused to 
concede majogt]' xuk by negotiation, military campaigns generally referred 
24 John Lonsdale, quoted m Cooper, F, 1994, p. 1520 
25. See e g. Denoon, D , and Kuper, A., 1970. 
26. Cf. Coquery-VJdrovitch, C. (1997), who believes that francophone scholarship on 
Afnca has been rather poor m compariSion With anglophone productiOn. 
27. Suret-Canale, J., 1982 I am not sure who first applied the term "collaborators" to 
Afncans who worked with coloma! governments, but it seems to date from about 1960. 
28. When a leading Oxford historian referred disdainfully to Africa's past m 1963 as 
the "unrewardmg gyrations of barbarous tnbes", he was understandably treated to the scorn 
of all Africanists. See Fuglestad, F., 1992, esp. pp. 311-12. 
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tQas:'&rmed struggl~" began to take place., There was _an ?~vio_us and simple 
relation between the sense of history and the moral JUStificatiOn for armed 
struggle against continuing colonial or settler rule2 9 . 
Postcolonial Africa 
Some of the fundamental elements of an intellectually viable view of 
African nationalism, as sketched in the previous few paragraphs,. were easy 
enough to accept during the first two decades of independence m most of 
Africa, since the the new nationalist governments were, f?r the mostyart, 
bringing a recognisable system of political order and relative prospenty ~o 
their populations and pursuing a ~ommitt?ent to a strategy of. economic 
development which had broad mternatwnal support. The Idea of a 
triumphant nationalism, poised to move forward, gav~ succ?ur both to 
African governments and their international partners ; It was m harmony 
with the international consensus operative after 1945 on the need to govern 
the world through sovereign political units usually defi~ed by reference ~o 
nationality; it appeared to be evidence of progress ; and It seemed to e~~lam 
the rapid speed of decolonisation in the 1950s. As long as these ?onditwns 
applied, then nationalist historian~ such. ~s Ranger coul~ hold their own _not 
only against European conservative cntlcs but, more Importantly, ag~mst 
those radical pessimists who, in_ the spirit of Frantz F~non, regarded ~fncan 
nationalism as a European creatiOn as much as an Afncan one, a vehicle for 
the transmission of neo-colonial interests3o. . . 
All of these factors tended to deflect attention from the histoncal 
shortcomings of what was, by the 1970s, the ortho_dox nationalist view of 
resistance to colonialism. The central weakness of this theory was the danger 
inherent in the proposition that Africans who took up arms to oppose the 
imposition of colonial rule at its inception, generally around the end of the 
nineteenth century, were "primary resisters", so calle~ bec~use th~y were 
forerunners of the "secondary resisters" or modern natwnahsts. This made 
it all too tempting to read history backwards by implying that, since mod~rn 
African leaders were nationalists, then earlier opponents of coloma! 
goverment must have been proto-nationalists. This supposition d~d some 
disservice to the historical data. In the first place, many early resisters of 
colonial rule were most probably unaware of the existence of sue? thi~gs as 
national states, and so it is hardly accurate to consider them as nauonahsts of 
any sort. The retrospective identification of them. as f~rebears of modern 
nationalism is based on an absence of careful consideratiOn of exactly what 
29. South Africa had techmcally been an mdependent state sinc_e 1910, but tts 
condition bore such an obvtous similarity to coloma! rule that the South Afncan Commumst 
Party considered apartheid to be "colonialtsm of a special type". 
30. Ranger, T., 1968a, p. XXI. 
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they themselves thought they were doing when they took up arms. More 
prosaically, a number of people who emerged at the time of independence as 
nationalist leaders had in fact worked closely with the colonial authorities at 
various stages of their careers, typically as government officials, as soldiers, 
or in receipt of official patronage such as scholarships, all of which calls for 
a nuanced understanding not only of their relationship to the colonial 
authorities but also that which they had with less privileged strata of the 
African population. Furthermore, there are many examples of African 
nationalist leaders of the mid- to late twentieth century claiming as proto-
nationalist forebears social groups or sociological strata with which they 
actually had little connection. This is related to the fact the anti-colonial 
struggle itself was rather less than a substantial threat to colonial rule in 
many cases. O~!?~Ld~ AJ.g~r!l;l and~ SOJ!th~rn ~frica, there were in fact 
strikingly few C!l~es of anti-£QJQnjal_arlJ!e<lmovements forcing the path to 
de'C'Olonlsatfon~ Where SU£h~,IDOVements did occur after 1945, such as in 
Madagascar, "Camef£~lfi!!<1. ~~nxa, th~y were,~defeated before independence 
a~WhOTe<:f !11~.1!1 in tg~ (iil,d rarely tasted the fruits of power. In 
~practice common among African nationalists of postcolonial times,/ 
of claiming to be the descendants of a long line of doughty fighters for 
liberation, often looks suspiciously like a revival of the old practice of 
manipulating genealogies. 
This is not to deny that some parts of Africa witnessed constant acts of 
r~sfii'ii'Ce to co1oillal rule tnrougbouuhe sixty or seventy years for which 
cQ!~ii>~~f!l!ll~.!!! _,g~I}~£~!!Y. l~s!~qz, !lOr to deny the validity of seeing such 
-~ruso es as part oC<!lml&.CU~.£luence Ofevetfts. Our suggestion is, however, 
thatirfsposs1ble to construct such~ a sequence in various terms other than as 
a narrative of African nationalism. It is at least theoretically possible in 
many cases to see episodes of armed resistance to colonial authority as fitting 
more convincingly into a history of banditry, for example31, or at least of 
some form of localised political action, or as a means of economic 
accumulation or as a cultural phenomenon32. Conversely, it is possible to 
tras:~ the history of nationalism- other. than as a -story of resistance to 
colonialism. Nationalism could be construed, for example, primarily as a 
discourse concerning the centralisation of power or the formation of social 
Cl.!~¥8· .. 1fs it sometimes was by Marxist scholars3 3, or as a process of 
imagining34. Underlying such .. £erspectives is the question of whether it is 
most convincing to consider mqclern African nationalism primarily as the 
cliqmx of three- or more generations of struggle against colonialism. It is a 
rather pedestrian thought, but perhaps one actually entertained by substantial 
numbers of Africans today, that modern African politicians might be most 
accurately viewed primarily as skilled manipulators of power rather than as 
people driven by~a romantic attachment to a particular ideology, and that it 
31. Crummey, D., 1986, and espectally the essay by Ralph Austen on pp. 89-108. 
32. Cf. Glassman, J., 1995. 
33. Leys, C., 1996, esp. pp. 143-63. 
34. E.g. Mbembe, A., 1991. 
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is their pursuit of power which sometimes causes them. to invoke aspects of 
the past, real or fictitious or mixed35. Approaches of this .type could be us~d 
to construct an alternative interpretation of the events which, to observers m 
the 1960s, were most persuasively seen as evidence of the forward march of 
African nationalism. . 
If such a change of perspective has som.e explanatory power, It also 
underlines some of the risks inherent in the difficult, but nece.ssary, ~as.k of 
writing contemporary history, when historical data are sometimes difftcult 
to determine and, above all, when placing them in coher~nt sequences or 
patterns carries risks of misidentification. In retrospect, It appears th.at a 
tendency to suppose that nationalism was an unstoppable .force, com?med 
with a sometimes uncritical acceptance of the for~s It .took, blmd~d 
Africanist scholarship as a whole to the many case~ m wh~~h su.bstanttal 
segments of Africa's populations, and legitimate Afncan P.ohtiCal mterests, 
were full of foreboding for a future under the particular brand of 
nationalism which was actually emerging. Some of the events of recent years 
compel us to reconsider these. Buru~!~. ~Q[_ ~~~!JlPl~ •. ~WJlS .~nl¥ or~e. of 
several African countries in which a suostantlal sectwiL~f nrga~Ised political. 
opinion in the 1950s argued against an immediat7 grantmg of I.ndependence 
which it feared would be dominated by a minonty g_roup._ as IS clear fr~~ 
the document known as the Manifeste des Bahutu. In the hght of Bu~ndi ~ 
postcolonial history, the fears of what the authors of t~is text termed Tu~si 
colonialism" cannot be said to have been wholly misplaced. Subst.antlal 
sections of the population in other countries also had reas~:m to fea~ th~Ir fate 
under political systems which had inherited the coloma! organ!satwn of 
power into formidable monopolies, ~~ QOmpara~l~ mov~~~!!t~ -~-g~~!!~· 
Cameroon and Madagascar indicate36. Those Afncans who, on tne ve~ge of 
r independence, actually faced the prospect of ~overnment. by the particular 
groups and individuals who had acquired or seized power m .the. name of t~e 
nation, all too often had reason to fear the hegemonic aspirat!ons of. th~Ir 
new leaders. The foreign Africanist intellectuals who were so mfluential m 
creating the historiography of nationalis';ll, on t~e ot?er hand, generally had 
less reason for fear : in most cases, unhke Afncan mtellectuals, they were 
not threatened by the darker side of a Sekou Toure o~ a Kamuzu Banda or 
by any of the armed corporations which came to prohferate throughout the 
continent. 
Chad is another country which provides i~teresti~g food ~or thou~ht on 
the nature of armed struggle in postcolomal Afnca and Its relatiOn to 
nationalist historiography, and since it is also the main field. of study ~f the 
sociologist Rob Buijtenhuijs, it is useful to.consider the Chadian case bnefly. 
The territory marked on the map as €had did not correspond to any stable 
or well defined political entity in the nineteenth century but ~as one of 
many territories in Africa which ~cq~ired the contours of ~ts current 
political definition in the act of colomsatwn. It was actually the site of some 
35. Cf. Toulabor, C., 1986; Mbembe, A., 1992. 
{.t6.Raison-Jourde, F., 1997. 
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of th~ ~ongest lingering resistance to French colonial rule, with expeditions 
of military co~quest o.r pacification still being launched against armed 
?PPOnents unttl well mto the twentieth century. When Chad became 
mdependent, at the same time as most other African colonies of France in 
1960,. it was no mo~e than three decades after all parts of the country had 
s.u~mitted to la f!atX colonia/e. Just five years later, in 1965, a series of 
nsi~gs be~an W~Ich soon came t? be identified as a campaign led by the 
Natwnal Ltberatwn Front or Frolmat, an organisation which claimed to be 
fig?ting. for the liberation of the country. Frolinat, allied to radical 
natwnahst governments in Algeria and Libya, was opposed to the Chadian 
governm~nt l~d by Franc;:ois Tombalbaye which had been supported by 
Fran_ce smce Independence and which Frolinat qualified as neo-colonial. 
~rohnat thus purported to be fighting not merely for Chad's formal 
md~I?ende?ce froll!- colon~al rule, which had already been attained, but for a 
pohti~~l disp~nsatwn whiCh would bring a different type of liberation, one 
Ident~fi~d With fr~edoll!- from the set of relationships known as neo-
colomahsm and With victory over the various elements of the Chadian 
population who supported that arrangement. 
.~he C~~dian struggle went largely unstudied by scholars, other than by 
BUIJtenh~llJS. and a h~ndful of.others, and little remarked by journalists, at 
leas~ until VIOlence hit the capital of Chad in the late 1970s, by which time 
Frolmat had advanced to lay siege to the central organs of the state. 
The.reafter,. the victory of Fr~linat, or at least of some of its offspring, set 
an mterestmg precedent as It became the first armed movement with a 
relatively broad social base (as distinct, that is, from a faction in the armed 
forces launching a classic coup d'etat) to take power, not from a colonial 
g~vernment, ~ut ~rom a postcolonial African one. This feat was achieved by 
Hissene Habre, himself a former protege of the colonial administration like 
so many nationalists in the first flush of independence, in 1982. 
The ~ignificance of Habre' s seizure of power escaped widespread notice 
at the time, largely, no doubt, because of Chad's relative obscurity and 
because of the major role played in the country by foreign powers 
especially France, Libya and, later, the USA. It was only when Yoweri 
Muse~e~i repeated Habr~'s achievement four years later, by overthrowing 
the existmg government m Kampala, that significant international attention 
was turned to the new phenomenon of a broad-based armed movement 
Iibera.ting an African countr~ from a home-grown despot rather than from 
coloma! rule. The tortured history of Uganda, the huge attention which the 
tyrannical Idi Amin had earlier received from international news media 
Museveni's own political and intellectual dexterity, and the gradual endin~ 
of the Cold War, all combined to make Uganda appear a new paradigm of 
how an oppressed African people could free itself from a home-grown 
dictatorship3 7. 
. Th~s gave a new t_wist to the historiography of nationalist wars of 
hberatwn. For, ~y the time_ Muse_yeni came to power in 1986, Mozambique, 
~ .... '<. ~ 
37. Cf. Hansen, H.B., and Twaddle, M., 1991. 
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Guinea-Bissau am! Angola hacLbeen fre~d fJOID Ponugqt;_~~£.QJ..<>l}i_al rl!le, 
anT-ziriil)abwe' s liberation movements had overthro~f! "th_~ _.~i~!!kt' 
·gp?"ernmeni of Ian Smith: The ~nly places~ r~rn_a~n~!}g f~r Jibe_rati.mt frQ_m 
European colonial or settler rule were Nam1bxa .and S9uth ~~tf!s~~ The 
apogee of African nationalism - the liberation of a whole co~tment -:- was 
nearing its zenith. This was not, however, cause for u?alloyed JOY: ~or It was 
apparent that the commitment ?f a :-"hole gen.eratwn of politiCian~ and 
intellectuals to the idea of the liberation of Afnca had not resulted m the 
progress that had been hoped for, and which indeed was implicit in th~ very 
notion of national liberation. In retrospect, one of the most far-sighted 
essays published in the late 1980s was one by the British hist?rian. Mic~ael 
Crowder, who wondered, concerning the commonly held natwnahst v~ew, 
"whose dream was it anyway3a ?"Throughout the continent there ~ere signs 
of a growing disillusion with various nationali~t .lea~ers and parties whose 
sparkle had faded once they were in power, a disillusiOn s.o wides?read that 
it could not simply be ignored or explained aw~y with plautud~s, as 
ideologues of nationalist regimes had done so often m the past. Algena, an 
inspiration for earlier African nationalists, still .ruled. b~ the Front . de 
Liberation Nationale (FLN), was engulfed by senous notmg, amountmg 
almost to a popular insurrection, in 1988. ~y this time there w~s a 
widespread perception, including among African mtellectuals .• that the. giants 
of African nationalism who had had the good sense to engmeer their own 
retirement, most notably Senghor and Nyerere, had been more far-sight.~d 
than those who were still in power, like Kaunda, Banda or Houphouet-
Boigny, whose reputations were fast becoming tarnished as. their earlier 
achievements began to appear in a different light. In these ctrcum~ta~ces, 
Yoweri Museveni's National Resistance Army in Uganda seemed to mdtcate 
to some observers the possibilities offered by a new type of armed stru~gle, 
one freed from some of the illusions or immaturity of the prevwus 
generation, endowed with a more thoughtful and educated leadership and a 
more useful analysis of what precisely needed doing to secure a better future 
for Africa. 
Those who were inclined to view certain movements of armed opposition 
to postcolonial African governments as new forms of national liberation, 
were essentially basing their case on an updated identificati~n of who, or 
what was the factor inhibiting Africa's progress towards the higher form of 
political life implicit in the notion of national liberation. Whereas a slightly 
earlier generation had considered colonialism to be the enemy, the ta:get 
had shifted to neo-colonialism : substantially the same enemy, but m a 
different guise. This corresponded to a view of Afri.c~· s po~itic~l economy 
which was fashionable in the 1970s among many poht1cal scientists, namely 
the "dependency theory" which held that countries of the third world, being 
on the periphery of a capitalist economic system which reached throughout 
the globe, could not hope to advance to any higher .stage of political or 
economic development unless they could decrease their dependency on the 
38. Crowder, M., 1987. 
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industrialised. core countries3 9. While dependency theory was in high retreat 
from academic lecture halls in the West by the time Museveni took power in 
Uganda, it remained popular among many African intellectuals and 
continued to inspire a degree of support from Marxist analysts in the face of 
the neo-liberal theories which were then sweeping through Western 
academies of learning. Other commentators were beginning to see Africa's 
fundamental problem as lying in the institutional forms of power, largely 
inherited from the colonial period. This, according to a prominent strand in 
Africanist thinking, had imposed on Africa an ill-adapted form of 
government4 0. If it were true that Africa was struggling under the weight of 
imported institutions of government, then it was logical to seek better-
adapted forms which were home-grown. Hence, despite the unhappy 
precedents already set by African leaders (most notably, Mobutu Sese Seko) 
who had claimed to have discovered an authentically African way of doing 
things, President Museveni of Uganda was very successful in recruiting 
international support for his no-party system of government on the grounds 
that this was a genuinely Ugandan alternative to non-African systems of 
democracy. 
However, by the late 1980s the very notion that an African country could 
be liberated from an oppressive political regime by force was being 
challenged as a result of a number of factors at least as important as the 
demise of certain theories of political economy. Parts of Africa were now 
home to movements which had many of the hallmarks of guerrilla armies, 
and could demonstrate at least a fair degree of popular support, but which 
were difficult to classify. One of these was the Uniao para a Independencia 
Total de Angola. For most Africanist scholars, Jonas Savimbi's UNITA 
organisation could not be considered a liberation movement since it was 
opposed to a government which was already held to have liberated Angola, 
and in any case Savimbi was allied to the illegitimate apartheid regime and 
the US secret services. Nevertheless, UNITA refused to go away. It 
constituted an uncomfortable reminder that not all large-scale armed 
movements could automatically be regarded as forces of liberation even 
when, like UNIT A, they had at least some degree of popular support. This 
was also a consequence of a strategic choice by the US government under 
Ronald Reagan (1980-88), or by elements within it, to fight the Cold War by 
sponsoring a new wave of anti-Marxist guerrillas wherever appropriate, by 
encouraging movements like UNIT A in Angola or the Nicaraguan Contras. 
How''was ~ person intent on Africa's liberation to di.stinguish genuine 
movements of emaiictptt!1orr'Tionrbogus ones ? By reference to their 
political programmes ? The problem was that such movements invariably 
claimed that their ultimate goal was some sort of freedom. In practice, 
observers ended up by judging the merits of various armed movements by 
reference to their external allies, thus binding African liberation movements 
39. Leys, C., op. cit., pp. 107-96. 
40. E.g. Davidson, B., 1992. A similar view in French political science is expressed 
in Badie, B., 1992. An influential recent variant is Mamdani, M., 1996. 
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/inextricably into the politics of the Cold War. This was on~ reason ~hy 
,Ethiopia'posed the biggest puzzle of all : for w?o we.re the hberat~rs m a 
war, growingly severe throughout the 1980~, m whtc? se~eral dtffe~ent 
guerrilla movements, many having ?oth Marxtst and nattonahst ~redent!a~s, 
were opposed to a home-grown Afncan government, and a Marxtst-Lemmst 
, one at that ? . . 
' 1 The burgeoning number of armed movements m Afnca seemed 
1 'increasingly to suggest that the continent was in need not s~. much. of 
' liberation from dependence on the West, as of some form of.pohttcs whtch 
was marked by real power-sharing, and not merely by the seiZure o~ p~ow~r 
by one armed group from another. Even ~ENAMO, th~ R.esistencia 
Nacional Mo~ambicana, in Mozambique, considere~ by Marxist-mfluen~ed 
scholars to be a-political in the sense of representmg. a form.. of bandttry 
rather than any constituency with real roots in Mozambican society: or used 
as a simple front for the South African De~en~e Force, came to be mcl~d~d 
in the literature which called out for rethmkmg on the natur~ of Afnca s 
liberation from colonial rule, particularly after the pathbreaki~g study by 
the French anthropologist Geffray had revealed that Renamo gamed support 
from substantial peasant grievances41. . . . . 
Moreover seismic shifts in global society and politics were changmg 
some previods ideological positions. The astonis~ingly rapid collaps~ ?f the 
Soviet empire in 1989 raised fundamental questions about the vtabihty of 
concepts such as liberation and revolution which had been ~?mmon curre~cy 
in African political ideology for decades. A wave of pohttcal. contestatiOn 
within Africa itself, leading to the overthrow of one-party regimes through 
largely or entirely non-violent means in Benin a~d Mali, and the re'?ov~l 
from power by constitutional means of the foundmg. fathe~ of the ?attoll: m 
Zambia, gave powerful incentives to rethink the p.artt~ular ~dea of hberat~on 
which had become current since Africa's decolomsatton t~Irty ~ears ear~Ier, 
and most particularly the frequent supposition that true liberatiOn requtred 
force of arms. 
In the excited atmosphere of late 1989 and early 1990, with the .fall of t?e 
Berlin wall and the release from prison of Nelson Mandela, som~ mfluenttal 
outside observers were keen to apply to Africa what they believed to be 
lessons learned from the triumph of capitalism and democracy. Among the 
most important of those acting thus was the World Ba~k, which called for 
the political reform of African countries in a report pubh~hed, by chance, at 
the same time that the Berlin wall was breached42 • The simultaneous end ?f 
the Cold War and the collapse of African one-party states offered to aid 
donors, so influential in a continent where most governments ~nd ev~n states 
had become dependent on official loans and grants for their su~vtval, an 
opportunity to reinforce the programmes of politi~al and economic reform 
which the main donor agencies had come to beheve were ?ecessary for 
Africa's well-being. It is not irrelevant to note that a substantial part of the 
41. Geffray, C., 1990. 
42. World Bank, 1989. 
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academic research done on Africa is fmanced by these same donors not 
merel~ in th~ vague. sense that many universities in Europe and North 
Amenca recetve fundmg from their national governments, but in the form 
of contracts for specific items of research offered by donor institutions to 
both. W ~stern. Afri~~nists and African scholars, the latter often trying to 
surv~v~ m .umverstttes starved of funds. The foreign ministries and aid 
admmistratwns of Western governments, developing an interest in such 
concepts as democracy and civil society in pursuit of their mission to 
manage the process of change in Africa, invested in research on these 
subjects and had a considerable influence on some emerging Africanist 
debates. 
~he signifi~ance of this last observation is to underline that, just as an 
earher generatiOn of writers had been inclined to construct a nationalist 
historiography which could be enlisted in the causes of state-building and 
nation-building, there were now numbers of consultants, scholars and others 
inte:ested in e~amining. democ~ati,sation and the role of civil society in 
Afnca and re-mterpretmg Afnca s recent past in the service of their 
purpose, even though writing or rewriting history was not usually their 
primary objective. Thus, in the early 1990s, democracy was often deemed to 
l!old out the promise of whaLwas,s.Qmetimes called a "second liberation" of 
{\frica. This ~jJile around, ~ibe.r_atjon ~as no long~r tq b~ fn>rii ~olonial rule, 
lwt fro~ national qppresswn., To many observers, the struggle to liberate 
1\ffi~a, often clothed in the vocabulary of development, now appeared to 
require" not so much armed force as a combination of parliamentary 
government, press freedom and civil liberty, the whole compatible with the 
proposition that an economic revival could be based on free trade43. 
The demise of Marxism as both political force and analytical tool, and the 
fashion for liberal theories of democracy and civil society, alas, did not 
mark the end of political violence in Africa. On the contrary, war in Liberia 
after _1989 and Sierra. Leone ~ter_I991, civil war in Somalia culminating in 
the disastrous U~/Umted Nations mtervention of 1992-4, and, especially, the 
Rwandan genocide of 1994, all marked major new epicentres of violence. It 
was now clear to observers of every shade of opinion that armed 
movements, even where they had some degree of organisation and popular 
support. and claimed to be liberating some group or other, could not 
automatically be regarded as forces for emancipation or progress as so many 
writers had been inclined to believe in earlier decades. To be sure, there was 
an ~mportant current of pan-Africanist revolutionary thought which 
con~mued to hold that arn;ted struggle still had a place in the emancipation of 
Afncan peoples, and which even underwent something of a revival under 
the inspiration of Musevem 's achievement. The Seventh Pan-African 
Congress held in Kampala in 1994, for example, expressed this in a 
statement to the effect that the first phase of the African revolution had 
43. Buijtenhuijs, R., and RiJnierse, E., 1993, and Buijtenhuijs, R., and Thinot, C., 
1995, provide useful surveys of much of this literature. This research was financed by the 
Netherlands Mm1stry of Development Cooperation. 
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ended with the overthrow of white domination of South Africa, but that this 
had not solved the basic needs of the people, which required further 
struggle44. But many armed struggles were hugely destructive and appeared 
to some commentators to have no coherent political programme whatever. 
Many analysts began to adopt a more anthropological approach to some 
campaigns, which suggested that some at least might better be understood as 
complex social phenomena rather than campaigns in support of modern 
political ideologies4s. It was not only in Africa that war, in the confusing 
new world of the 1990s, seemed to have left the realm of political and 
military studies. A leading British historian in 1993 infamously described 
the war in Bosnia as "a primitive, tribal conflict only anthropologists can 
understand46," a remark rich in implications. 
These tumultuous events were bound to have an effect on historiography 
by causing writers to re-evaluate the meaning of earlier historical events. 
For, while the world after the Cold War was turning out to be a more 
violent place than many had hoped or expected, some old champions of 
national liberation in Africa were still in power. Some mov~ments, and 
some leaders, whose claim to have liberated their country jn el!rli~Dm'ies 
had been widely accepted, were now beginning to look un£_omfortably_like 
OJ?pressors in their tur?, in. some cas~s as much .so as th~ colonisers ~hom 
they~had replaced. Thts ratsed a senes of questiOns whtch had previOusly 
been largely avoided in the historical literature about the nature of liberation 
as a political and social process. Who precisely had been liberated by ZANU 
in Zimbabwe in 1980, for example ? A series of pogroms launched by 
Prime Minister Robert Mugabe in Matabeleland in the mid-1980s, in which 
thousands of Matabele people were killed on the grounds that they were 
potential supporters of the political opposition, raised the uncomfortable 
thought, in a country which had been a shop-window for the cause of 
national liberation, that the identification of those liberated might be partly 
couched in ethnic terms. 
This last suspicion - that the fruits of power in independent Africa had 
been distributed partly according to ethnic criteria - opened up a vast 
Pandora's Box which nationalist ideology had to a large extent managed to 
keep closed, concerning the exact relationship between nationalism and 
ethnicity in Africa4 7. Not only was the impartiality of postcolonial 
governments open to question on ethnic grounds, but some even wondered 
about their good faith in regard to the concept of development, which had 
always been claimed as one of the great goals of nationalist policy. Hence, 
the Nigerian writer Claude Ake wondered whether African governm~ts 
had ever believed in the notion of development in the first 'place:-OrWilether 
they had not just cynically used this notion as a slogan whicfi permitted them 
44. Essack, K., 1994. 
45. E.g. Bazenguissa-Ganga, R., 1999. 
46. John Keegan, quoted in Mazower, M., 1999, p. XIV. 
47. A recent summary is Berman, B., 1998. 
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to pursue their re~l a~enda, that of acquiring and manipulating power4s. 
fusras-1t1Ceqtle'Stf?rre'Cttheus-e~tch had· actually been made of the idea 
of develo~ment, s~ dtd other observers question other major aspects of the 
old par~~Igm ~! hb.eration. Some analysts of earlier liberation wars like 
Rob ButjtenhUIJS, disturbed by the growing violence of the continent and 
struck by the poor .record in power of so many former liberation 
movements, turned th~Ir hopes towards peaceful political change. For them 
the second wave of liberatiOn would no longer be through the barrel f ' 
gun, but through the ballot-box. In a similarly prudent vein the M 
0 
· ~ 
scholars J~hn Saul and Coli~ ~eys, veteran opponents of ap~rtheid, a~~:e 
concerned m a book on Namibta to ask questions concerning the incoming 
goverment. formed by the South-West African People's Organisation 
~wapo, which had been guilty of terrible abuses of human rights even befor~ 
It .c~me to pow~r49 .. some .scholars have come to interpret new political-
military camp~Ig?s m Afnca as forms of warlordism or other types of 
combat less upbf~mg than romantically conceived struggles for liberationso 
In the field ~f stnct~y historical study, while Zimbabwe continues to rovid~ 
one of the nchest literatures on nationalist guerrillas a new note h p b 
sou.nded. by ~orma Kriger in her description of th~ coercive ele~~nt~~ x' 
natiOnalist vwlence. New studi.es of the apparently inchoate violent 
movement~ of the 1990s, such as m Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Liberia, are 
~lso appeanngsl. · 
Although Africanist sch.olars during the 1980s and 1990s have tended, 
rather rftor~ than the prevw_us generation, to question the credentials of 
would-be h?erat~rs, the vestiges of the earlier notion that Africa could be 
freed by a .hberatwn move~ent which marked a radical break with the ast 
hav~ not /tsappeared, even If the suggestion often made in earlier literafure 
to t e ef ect that t~is was achieved ~~st fully by force of arms, has now 
bec.o~e less prot?ment. In an exquisite irony, the notion that African 
~ciet.tes may be liberated by radical political action, earlier identified with 
arxisi?, has no':" . been. assumed by certain Western administrations 
respo!lsible for gtvmg fmancial aid to Africa. Influential US media 
especially h~ve en~ertained the notion that there has arisen a generation of 
new leaders m Afnca, of whom Y oweri Museveni is generally seen as the 
archetype, who. have taken power in their own countries by force of arms 
fr~m postcolomal goverments, notably in Uganda Rwanda Ethiopia and 
Ent:ea: and. who ar~ using their. conquest of powe~ to rebuiid states alon 
capttahst-!nen~ly hnes52 • The tdea of a progressive, US-friendly, secon~ 
wa~~ of liberatiOn ha~ been enthusiastically taken up by the president-in-
watttng of South Afnca, Thabo Mbeki, who has turned the notion of an 
JR1 Ake, C., 1996. 
~: Leys C., and Saul, J., 1995. 
_, ,jq· E.!!· Clapham, C., 19?8; and Reno, W., 1998. 
1 999~~~ · IV!_~~r,-!:!.,J?~? ; Rtchards, P., 1995 ; Ellis, S., 1999; Human Rights Watch, 
52. Cf. Ottaway, M., 1999. 
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African Renaissance into a comer-stone of his politics 53. In truth, this was a 
grotesque proposition even before several of the much-vaunted ~ew leaders 
of Africa launched a particularly murderous new round of wars m the Horn 
and in central Africa in 1997-8. Many of those very same new leaders who 
were courted and praised by the US State Department, th~ Pentagon an.d. the 
World Bank are former Marxists wh? in f.a~t s~Ill head I?~ht~cal 
organisations run along recognisably Marx1st-Lemmst hnes : the m1htans~ 
of Museveni, Afewerki, Meles, Kagame and others suggests that they st1ll 
retain a robustly Leninist belief in the merits of force. Money may these 
days come from the West, but power in Africa still comes all too often from 
the barrel of a gun. . . 
Many of the finest African scholars these days have found. JObs abroad, ~n 
the USA especially, where they tend to become subsumed m US d~I?estlc 
debates, particularly those concerning .ll!'ulticu!turalism and the P.oht1cs. of 
identity. Some of the best African political thmkers or an~lysts, ~nclu~mg 
some who previously worked on the historiograph.Y of na~wnal hberatwn, 
have become immersed in the field of postcolomal studies,. w?ere ~~me 
African expatriates have endeavoured to explore. aspects of ~fnca s poh~1cal 
ideologies, often in ways distinctly unflattenng to the 1dea of .Afncan 
nationalisms4. Postcolonial discussions of memory, r~pre~entatlon ~nd 
cultural invention all leave a rather uncomfortable histon~al 9uest~on 
concerning who actually created the earlier nationalist ideologies, m wh1ch 
so many of the most academically influential works we~e penned ~y non-
Africans or in fact more precisely by British and Amencans. It :mses the 
haunting' question to what extent African nationalism has been, m p~rt, ,a 
foreign creation at well as an African one, as Ake t~ough~ of Af~tca s 
commitment to development. If at least one of the chenshe~ 1deolog1es of 
African politics could be called into question so brutally as 1t was by Ake, 
could not others ? 
Ideology and history 
All ideologies, it is said, share :·t~e wid~spr~ad. virtue that i?en~if.ies 
History with the winning sidess" .. Th1s 1de~log1~al ~nsistence on mamtammg 
an interest only on those ideas wh~ch are ~Ith .hmds1ght deemed to ha~e been 
winning ones was a characteristic of ?l.stonograp?y generally dunng the 
Cold War, and certainly not just of wntmg.on Afr1ca. A recent attemp~ to 
retrace the history of Europe in the twentieth ce~tury a~ far ~s P.ossible 
without viewing it through any particular ideological pnsm, viewmg the 
53. There appears to be no full study of South Africa's African Renaissance. See e.g. 
Indicator South Africa 1998. 
54. Notably Mbembe, A., 1992. . 
55. Ignazio Silone, quoted in Mazower, op. c1t., p.XI. 
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present. as. "just one possible o~tcol!le of our predecessors" struggles and 
~ncertamties, rather than as the mevltable progress of some great historical 
Idea such as democracy or national liberation, is illuminating56. It would be 
useful to apply the same technique to the history of Africa's decolonisation 
and .of th~ various ~ontests wh~ch have been called armed struggles or wars 
of hberatwn. In th1s last sectiOn we will briefly consider some possible 
approaches towards re-reading the late colonial and postcolonial period of 
African history with a similar lack of any ideological prism. 
Perhaps it is first necessary at least to acknowledge the limits of such an 
approach, for all history-writing, we have said, carries within it suppositions 
ab~ut rationality and time which could be said to be of an ideological nature. 
Th1s does not, however, mean that all history writing is condemned to be 
ideological in a narrower sense, or that historians cannot redress their own 
biases. In fact, they always have the option to resist to the best of their 
ability the temptation to extend contemporary ideas or concerns back into 
the past in a single-minded manner. They can strive to recreate the context 
in which previous generations lived and acted. They can give due attention 
to thos~ undercurrents of earlier history which were important at the time, 
b~t wh1ch .are neglected by more ideological investigations interested single-
mmdedly m results. Just as Europe's own tortured history can be better seen 
as "a story of narrow squeaks and unexpected twists, not inevitable victories 
and for.ward ma~~hesS7 ':, so might it be profitable to see the last fifty years 
of Afncan pohttcal history other than as the triumphal progress of 
liberation from colonial rule and of nationalism. \ 
In fact, it requires little demonstration to show just how far Africa's \ 
recent history has been something less than a triumph, since the period since 
the 1970s is so widely acknowledged to have been a difficult one. While 
there are no remaining colonies or white settler regimes in Africa, and in 
that sense African nationalism may be said to have attained one of its main 
goals, the heroic vision of African nationalism, connected as it is to the 
notion of progress, could not be expected to escape the recent travails of 
African states. This indeed calls for a view which pays full attention to what 
may earlier have seemed the pools and eddies of history movements and 
id~as which did not actually attain power, turning-poidts where history 
failed to turn. Perhaps the current vogue for historical studies of culture, 
subjectivities, identities and everyday life may help in the long run inasmuch 
as they throw light on the nature of politics "from below". 
If we are to gain a new understanding of what actually occurred in self-
proclaimed wars of liberation in the past and in the present, above all more 
empirical research is needed on how Africans view the historical experience 
of their societies in the circumstances of distress or even trauma which 
obtain in places such as Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone or Somalia, but also in 
less blighted countries like Nigeria. There is evidence that many people in 
these countries, while, regarding the present period as a difficult one and the r 
I 
56. Ibid., p. XII. 
57. Mazower, M., op. cit., p. XII. 
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future with trepidation, regard its place in history primarily in religious 
termsss. Here historians can benefit from a rich lit~rature on the .study of 
religion in Africa. They can also learn from wnters on war m other 
contments and periods, some of whom have noted the need for new 
historical research on earlier campaigns of arm~d. struggle, or at least for 
new ways of thinking about published data. This Is so partl~ because war 
itself has changeds 9, and scholars need new ~ools to stu~y It. It has been 
noted that debates on the origins of the Amencan rev?lutwn, for ~xample, 
tend to focus on socio-economic groups while negle~t~ng the. role. m even~s 
of military formations, a subject left to specialis~ mihtary histonans. ThiS 
seems to stem from a notion that war and revolutiOn, on the one hand, and 
social and economic developments, on the other, are best un?er~t?od. as 
separate things requiring separate study. This may have some JUStificatiOn 
for vast military campaigns like the First World War, but surely one. of the 
main lessons of modern wars is the major effect they have ?n economtcs and 
society. Conversely, those interested in political revolu.twns need to pay 
greater attention to the role of armies in. th<;>se .revolutl?ns. To take one 
example, whereas historians have been qmte 1~chn~d to mtet:pret fonns ~f 
public violence which occurred during coloma~ tpl}es. aJ)~ forms of -antl-
eolonial motest, thus constructing a chron?lo~~c~l ser~es ~~f _d~t~ ~~~ose 
outcome is mitional independence, recent examples of ptlla~m~ !!1 ~fn:can 
citfes might cause one to re-examine some earlier bJ>u~s _«:)f VI?l~n£e ~n hght 
of a logic of predation and·piunder6o. We may .agre~ ~tth David Keen6~n the importance of seeing war as a form of economic activtty, fo! exai?ple . 
One conclusion which can be drawn from a c?nsi.d~ratton of ~he 
historiography of nationalism, then, concerns t~e destrabil~ty of stu~~mg 
Africa's previous wars in a wide context of soctal, economic and pohttc~l 
history, and not merely with a single-minde~ con.cern to assess ?nly th~Ir 
contribution to particular ideologies of nat10nahs~. or ~ev?lutw?. Wtth 
hindsight, it is notable that some of the most stnkmg mstghts ~nto the 
questions raised by the exercise of viole~ce, and indeed by the expenence of 
nationalism and independence more wtdely, have actually come from the 
pens of novelists rather than those of historians or eve~ of scholars mo~e 
generally 52, Perhaps this is because so many of the .cruc~al ~evelopments. 10 
those decades have occurred in the realm of the tmagmatton, one whtch 
historians have, until recently at least, found it more difficu~t. or le~s 
interesting to explore than the more concrete sphere of human ~ctlvtty. If ts 
indeed the case as we have suggested, that political ideas in Afnca today are 
often embedd~d in religious forms of expression, then it suggests that 
58 Ellis, S , op crt. 
59 Van Creveld, M., 1991 
60. On the lootmg of c1t1es, see e.g Bazengmssa-Ganga, R , op. ctt. ; Ell1s, S., op. 
Ctt. 
61. Keen, D., forthcommg. 
62 1 am grateful to Fredenk van Gelder of the Johann Wolfgang Goethe Umverslty, 
Frankfurt, for pointing this out to me using the example of Coetzee, J., 1980. I would add to 
th1s other examples, such as Kourouma, A., 1970; Achebe, C., 1966, and 1983. 
AFRICA'S WARS OF LIBERATION 91 
historians might fruitfully contmue a tendency of recent years to investigate 
the workings of the Imagination. Certainly nationalism, the constitution of 
imagin~~ communities, lends-itself easily to such a project. 
~t probably too, historians who consider nationalism will need to 
reformulate one of the most enduring paradigms used by analysts of Africa, 
namely the perceived contrast between Africa and the outside, and between 
what is authentically African and that which is imposed or borrowed from 
the rest of the world. This has proved a resilient idea, which continues to 
inf~rm mu~h. ~nalysis of Africa and to provide material for reworking by 
Afncan pohttctans, as we have suggested. But the observation that African 
societies have historically been more remarkable for their porous 
boundaries rather than their strict rules of exclusion, and that political 
power has for centuries, even before the colonial period, been connected to 
the successful manipulation of external connections, surely suggests the 
usefulness of seeking other models which are less dualistic in nature63. 
These are all lines of approach which may in time help us to reinterpret 
Africa's liberation wars. 
While scholars may react in these and many other ways to the unfolding 
of events in Africa and in the rest of the world, one effect has already been 
to weaken the consensus which previously existed concerning the "meaning" 
of the colonial period in African history and to dent the notion of 
natio~alis~ as a heroic project whose armed struggles, however regrettable, 
were me~ttable or necessary. Those who write on African politics, or on the 
history of nationalism, are generally considerably more cautious than they 
once were, since they are now aware that nationalism was unable to realise 
all of its promises, or even that nationalism may well be in need of 
reinterpretation in the light of other, wider patterns in African societies. Yet 
still, the very spread of the notion of a postcolonial condition inevitably 
implies the existence of a postcolonial historical period, whatever we may 
think of the quality of that period, whether heroic or other. In other words, 
we are still left with the now-classic division of African history into three 
periods defined by their relationship to colonial rule : precolonial, colonial, 
and postcolonial Africa. 
63. Bayart, J.-F., forthcommg. 
